CHAPTER ONE --1.5 & 1.6

1.5 Roots, Seeds, and Indivisibles The next triad of thinkers had several themes in common. Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus inherited a tradition of inquiry into the nature of material substance. The tradition had accrued over four generations of intellectual haggling in the marketplace of ideas. Not content to reinvest in monism, these bright young minds bet their fortunes in the hitherto untapped market of pluralism. Each sought to explain the multiplicity of things in the cosmos by supposing each thing a composite of multiple elements, in varied proportion, which were common to all things. Each proposed a different set of elements and, aside from superficial observations, none had a method for obtaining detailed sensory evidence. Empedocles declared a tetrad of root elements driven by a pair of opposites, Anaxagoras an unlimited wealth of 'seeds', and Democritus an infinite number of indivisibles-- atoms. All agreed that the qualitative differences between things could be explained by the relative quantities of their component elements arranged in a thing. While Empedocles ignored scale, Anaxagoras supposed his seeds could be cut up as small as you like while never losing their potency, and Democritus considered his indivisibles imperceptibly tiny yet very solid bodies. 1.5.1 Empedocles About the time Parmenides finished his poem of well-rounded truth, Empedocles was born (circa 484 BCE) in a Greek colony on the Island of Sicily, at the city of Akragas. A contemporary of Zeno, but invested in more practical matters, Empedocles developed a successful medical career and eventually established a school of medicine which gained reknown as the Sicilian School. He also wrote a treatise, On Nature, in which he prayed to the Muse that she might bring him "such words as are right and proper for ephemeral creatures to hear. You will not be urged, by some mortal ambitious to scale the heights of wisdom, to tell more than is fitting. Come now, with all your powers discern how each thing manifests itself, trusting no more to sight than to hearing, and no more to the echoing ear than to the tongue's taste; rejecting none of the body's parts that might be a means to knowledge, but attending to each particular manifestation." While in support of sensory evidence with Heraclitus and likewise cognizant of cyclic strife, Empedocles also respected the rationale of What Is. With Parmenides, he reasoned that Is must be imperishable. Yet a static pure Is-ness was useless for an explanation of the apparent multiplicity-- the wonderous variety of things-- in the cosmos. So this worthy doctor, master of the art which brings healing from disease, reasoned What Is as manifest in cyclic change. He considered What Is as the ground of "the four roots of all things". It requires "no birth in mortal things, and no end in ruinous death. There is only mingling and interchange of parts, and it is this that we call 'nature'. When these elements are mingled into the shape of a man living under the bright sky, or into the shape of wild beasts or plants or birds, men call it birth: and when these things are separated into their parts men speak of hapless death." The dynamic Is generates reality through a twofold process. "For at one time there grew to be a single One out of many, while at another time there came to be many by division out of One-- fire, water, earth, and the lofty height of air. Apart from these and in balanced relation to them is dreadful Strife; while Love resides in their midst, throughout their length and breadth." The perpetual recycling of One and many is driven by the two equal but opposing forces, Love and Strife, which now and again by turns gain an upper hand in the mixture of elements rooted in Is. The two forces "are the only things that are; and by interpenetrating they become one thing in one place and another in another. [Such basic things as] sunbeams and earth, sky and sea, [i.e., the four elements] are at one with the parts that compose them, even though thrown in different guises to mortals' apprehension." Whether or not we regard Empedocles' theory as a proper synthesis of the positions advocated by Heraclitus (Becoming) and Parmenides (Being), the lore of Love and Strife had some popular appeal. Besides which, all folk had immediate experience of fire, water, earth and air. Importantly, Empedocles was the first to explain particular things as composed with distinct particles of just these four elementals in varied proportion. Perceived qualities could thus be explained quantitatively. "[T]he forms and colors of all mortal things by the unifying power of Aphrodite [arise] out of water, earth, air, and sun [fire], mingled together", and a particular substance is explained as "perhaps with a little more of one [element], a little less of another." Empedocles described bone, for example, as two parts of earth, two parts water, and four parts fire "fitted together with the divine cement of right proportion." (Proportion, of course, harkens back to Pythagoras.) Without experimental evidence, such schema appeals to the imagination and can be applied to any object of substance. Might not a feather contain six parts air, one part earth, and one part fire? Or flint, eight parts earth and one part fire? Of course, we are never told how to measure one part of an element, be it air or fire, or how to mix them successfully. Yet experience with mundane cookery on the family hearth demonstrates that we do combine earthy stuff with water and fire (which requires air) to produce edible food. Subject only to idle speculation, the four 'roots' of substance were to prove durable as concepts, thanks in no small part to the subsequent refinement and certification of the concepts by Aristotle-- and, the persistence of Aristotle's written works over the millenia. Indeed, this tetrad of 'elements' was carried forward (from the Mediterranean, throughout Europe) by common knowledge as the key to any comprehension of the material world until disrupted by chemical evidence in the 18th century. Then a series of investigators known loosely as 'pneumatick' chemists isolated different gases, among them several components of air including 'phlogisticated air' (nitrogen), 'fixed air' (carbon dioxide), and a small volume of inert gas (argon). Lavoisier named the "purest part of the air" oxygen and a gas known as 'inflammable air', hydrogen. Then he went on to demonstrate that water is a compound of oxygen and hydrogen while others later showed atmospheric 'air' is a mixture of nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide, water vapor, and argon. Meanwhile, earthy compounds were demystified as alchemy slowly matured into analytic chemistry. Fire, however, did not yield its secret until the development of electron theory near the end of the 19th century. Although the doctrine of four elements was broadly propagated for several millenia after the death of Empedocles (circa 424 BCE), there were competing pluralistic theories proffered contemporaneously. Anaxagoras, for example, proposed myriad elements and argued that even air or water are not elemental but indeed, gross manifestations of a finer stuff-- very much finer, as we soon shall see. 1.5.2 Anaxagoras Born circa 500 BCE in Ionia at the city of Clazomenae, just north of Heraclitus' old haunt in Ephesus, Anaxagoras migrated to Athens as a young man to study philosophy. There he established a teaching practice in his maturity, tutoring aristocratic youth. As his career developed, Anaxagoras earned the distinction of being the first philosopher to flourish as a teacher in Athens. Among Anaxagoras' students was the young Pericles, who eventually became a successful political leader, and Euripedes, who later gained reknown as a dramatist. Anaxagoras was an elder contemporary of Empedocles in faraway Sicily. The younger theorist published first but, given Anaxagoras' position in a city-state (Athens) which would generate over the next few generations an Olympian array of philosophical luminaries, we might expect the older man to have had a greater influence. Yet the treatise published by Anaxagoras, On Natural Science, contained seeds of perplexity. While delectable to his immediate students, the seeds never found fertile ground amongst subsequent philosophers. We have something of Anaxagoras' teaching on substance from fragments of his treatise which survived the ravages of time. One sentence encapsulates his theory: "In everything there is a portion of everything else, except of mind; and in some things there is mind also." Imagine a collection of things, for example a hair, fig, rock, and flame. Each contains seeds (sperma) of the other-- and everything else. "For how could hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh?" Each particular thing comes into being only as one type of seed or another comes to dominate the mix-- of every thing's seeds-- in a particular substance. Unfortunately, Anaxagoras had no way to provide physical evidence for his theory. "Because of the weakness of our senses we are not able to judge the truth." We can only judge the master's reasoning which, of course, is empowered within his organic substance by seeds of mind. Lesser animals and plants, insofar as they have sentience, also manifest seeds of mind. Lest the sceptic demand to be told how seeds of all things could fit into a grain of sand as well as a large tree, Anaxagoras would explain: "In everything there is always a multiplicity of different ingredients; and there are as many ingredients separable from the lesser as there are ingredients separable from the greater." How many? As many as you like! An obvious question then arises. How small is each seed that they should all of every kind fit into the smallest thing? Given the previous answer on quantity, the question of magnitude is just as easily answered: "In the small there is no least, but always a lesser; for being cannot be defined by reference to not-being. Likewise there is always something bigger than what is big. The large and the small are thus equal in amount. And each thing taken from its own standpoint is large and small simultaneously." How small is each seed? As small as you like! The question of quality was, we suppose, answered by the quantitative predominance of some seeds over others, each seed manifesting its own particular quality. Thus "composite things contain many ingredients of the very greatest variety--the seeds of everything, having all kinds of characteristics, colors, and ways of affecting the sensitivities." Presumably, particular seeds come to dominate in a particular object by separation. "When all things were together, before any separating had taken place, not even any color was discernible. This was because of the utter mixture of all things-- of moist with dry, hot with cold, bright with dark." According to Anaxagoras, our present cosmos developed step-by-step from the primordial mixture, irreversibly. In the beginning: "All things were together, unlimited both in number and in smallness; for smallness too was unlimited. And when all things were together none of them could be distinguished because of their smallness." Beyond this, pure Mind (Nous) alone existed. "And Mind took charge of the cosmic situation, so that the universe proceeded to rotate from the very beginning. At first the rotation was small, but by now it extends over a larger space, and it will extend over a yet larger one. Both the things that are mingled and those that are separated and individuated are all known by Mind." Anaxagoras went on to explain that the vortex of rotary movement encompassed the cosmos, including "the revolving movements of the stars, of the sun and moon, and of the air and aether as they are being separated off. It was the rotary movement that caused the separation-- a separation of the dense from the rare, the hot from the cold, the bright from the dark, and the dry from the moist. When Mind first set things in motion, there began a process of separation in the moving mass; and as things were thus moving and separating, the process of separation was greatly increased by the rotary movement. ... The dense, the moist, the cold, and the dark came together here where the earth now is; while the rare, the warm, the dry, and the bright departed towards the farthest region of the aether." As the motion initiated by Mind fulfills its purpose, all the things familiar to the senses became properly separated and "when separation has taken place each kind of entity is fixed in amount." Beyond all this, "it may be that the separating and individuating process goes on not only in our own world but elsewhere too." In regard to such other worlds, we "should recognize the possibility that men may have been formed [from the substrate of seeds] as well as other organisms that possess souls; and that such men may perhaps dwell in cities and cultivate their fields just as we do, and that they have their sun and moon and other heavenly bodies as we do, and that their earth yields them vegetable life of all kinds, the most useful of which they harvest and take home to supply their needs." As his career developed, Anaxagoras not only earned the distinction of being the first philosopher to flourish as a teacher in Athens; he was also the first to be condemned by vested authority for ungodly statements. Or so the story goes about the aging philosopher's forced retirement. Anaxagoras was well known for teaching that the Moon and Sun, revered as Divine by the religious, were composed of mundane substance. The Selene body was, according to the philosopher, merely an earthy reflector of sunlight. Anaxagoras was not the first to make that claim. His assertion that Helios was merely a molten rock-- like all the other stars-- was perhaps more original and, as an integral feature of his cosmology, more threatening to public opinion. Writing from extant sources some five centuries later, Diogenes Laertius repeats alternate versions of the tale appended to the likely fact that pious Athenians brought charges against Anaxagoras. He was either tried solely for impiety or for treason as well. The charge of treason was said to have been politically motivated by enemies of Pericles. In either case, Pericles was the old philosopher's champion at trial but failed to gain acquital. Anaxagoras was either condemned to exile and lived out his life in dignity, or he was condemned to death. In the latter version of the story, Pericles got the sentence amended to exile but his aging teacher was so demoralized by the ordeal that he committed suicide soon after. 1.5.3 Democritus On the northern coast of the Aegean Sea, the Ionian city of Abdera was in ancient times hardly a world away from Athens. Yet that outpost of Greek polity in the barbarous lands of Thrace is only remembered for the sake of several notable philosophers and their influence in Athens. Protagoras, the eminent sophist mentioned only briefly below with Socrates, may have been born in Abdera circa 490 BCE (give or take a decade). More importantly, Abdera was the purported place in which Democritus was born (circa 460 BCE) and the location of a school established (circa 430-420 BCE) by Leucippus, who was said to have been born in Miletus. Little is known nowadays of Leucippus except that he taught Democritus the doctrine which became known as atomism and left one sentence to posterity: "Nothing happens at random; whatever comes about is by rational necessity." (DK Fragment 2) This was the world's first clear statement of strict determinism, although subsequent materialists would be unable to bolster it with experimental evidence for another two millenia. According to Diogenes Laertius writing in the third century CE, Leucippus studied under Zeno of Elea before developing his own radically different doctrine. While the Eleatics insisted upon the immobile permanence of Being and the absurdity of empty spaces (i.e., not-Being) within the cosmos, Leucippus explained the cosmos as a matter of tiny indivisibles in perpetual motion through the void. In the Greek tongue, the word for 'indivisible' was atomos and thus the word for the smallest whole particle of matter came down to us as 'atom'. With an eye to Eleatic doctrine, the atomists were careful to delineate the void as any place simply without atoms-- not not-Being but rather, any space to and from which atoms moved-- and insisted that atoms alone had true Being. "[I]n reality there are only atoms and the void." (DK Fragment 7) By this tactic, they hoped to reaffirm the common perception of motion (or, more generally, change in appearance) and restore its concept to rational apprehension while demoting not-Being as an issue in physics. While Leucippus left little record of his thoughts, Democritus published at least nine treatises on ethics and twelve concerning physics. Unfortunately, all were lost to us over the centuries. What little we have directly of Democritus is contained in a few sentences quoted by later writers from manuscripts extant in the classical period. The nearest general statements of Democritus' position in his own era are given by Aristotle and Theophrastus, the scholar who succeeded Aristotle as head of the Lyceum (described briefly below). The closest thing we have to a detailed statement of the atomist perspective is given by Lucretius in De rerum natura published circa 55 BCE, a single copy of which survived more or less intact down to our time. The content of that manuscript will be discussed in Chapter Three. According to Diogenes, Democritus "met Anaxagoras who was forty years his senior [but] disparaged Anaxagoras' theories of the cosmos and of the mind. There was a lack of sympathy between them amounting to hostility." We might suppose that the atomist theory was more specific and accessible than the Anaxagoran doctrine in its account of substantial phenomena yet had to compete for intellectual attention in its marketing of a universal substrate replete with miniscule components, i.e., atoms vs. seeds. Diogenes goes on to say that Democritus "despised fame, and when he visited Athens he did not make himself known to Socrates [who was about the same age as Democritus], although knowing well enough who he was." In an account of his travels around the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, including Egypt where he stayed for several years, Democritus is said to have written that "I am the most widely traveled man of all my contemporaries, and have pursued inquiries in the most distant places; I have visited more countries and climes than anyone else, and have listened to the teachings of more learned men." As for his philosophy, Democritus validated sensory perception while articulating a deeper sense of reality by distinguishing two types of knowledge, one 'obscure' and the other 'genuine'. (Importantly for us, both types of knowledge are useful and, as Heraclitus might have said, either type only works best in dialogue with the other.) In his own words, "Obscure knowledge includes everything that is given by [the five senses]; whereas genuine knowledge is something quite distinct from this. Whenever obscure knowledge can no longer [gain sense of] the objects because of their smallness [then we must resort to] a finer means of knowledge." In other words, we need consider atomic structure theoretically to obtain the deepest knowledge. "The truth is that what we meet with perceptually is nothing reliable, for it shifts its character according to the [object's] dispositions, influences, and confrontations." The sensible object varies in appearance as the prevailing conditions effect the insensible atoms, driving exterior atoms to effect the atoms within an object under scrutiny and thus changing its appearance. "By this criterion man must learn that he is divorced from reality." (The rhetorical use of 'divorce' would seem to have radicalized the debate yet, as Lucretius later states the case for atomism, our knowledge of atoms may readily enable a better union with our senses to enrich our perceptions.) As Aristotle explains the theory of atoms, Democritus "conceives them as so small as to elude our senses, but as having all sorts of forms, shapes, and different sizes. Treating them as elements he conceives of them as combining to produce visible and otherwise perceptible objects." Coming into contact during their unceasing motions, the atoms "tend to get ensnarled and interlocked." The atoms "fit snugly and so catch firm hold of one another; for some are scalene while others are sharply hooked, some are concave, others convex, and there are numerous other differences. [Democritus'] theory is that they cling together and remain in certain combinations until they are shaken apart and separated by outside forces." The apparent differences between one type of material and another are explained by the atomists as the result of the component atoms differing. According to Aristotle: "These differences, they say, are three-- shape and order and position. For they say the real is differentiated only by 'rhythm', and 'inter-contact' and 'turning'; and of these rhythm is shape, inter-contact is order, and turning is position; for A differs from N in shape, AN for NA in order, [horizontal H] from H in position." (Metaphysics, I.4.985b15) Theophrastus comments on the atomist explanation of the qualitative differences we perceive between one substance and another. "Differences of heaviness and lightness are explained by Democritus as ultimately differences of size. For if we could get down to atomic units, we would see that [since every atom is absolutely solid] the only standard of an atom's weight must be its size. In the case of compounds, on the contrary, two bodies of the same size might be of different weights; for the body containing more emptiness would be lighter, while that containing less would be heavier." The qualities of hard and soft manifest in a substance are explained as a function of the constituent atoms' packing, those packed more loosely creating a softer substance. Such qualitative differences are illustrated by two lumps of metal: "[Although iron is harder than lead, lead is heavier than iron. That is because the iron is of uneven composition, and its empty spaces are more numerous and bigger although the particles are more condensed in some places than in others. But its average of empty spaces exceeds that of lead." Some apparent qualities are explained as the effect which certain atoms have as they impinge upon our senses. "[S]weet consists of atomic figures that are rounded and not too hard; it softens the body by its gentle action." On the other hand, anything tasting sour "is composed of atoms that are angular, tiny, thin, and twisted." Hot and cold are explained as "merely a matter of configuration" and, given two samples of the same substance, "whatever has most empty spaces amongst its atoms is most heated." Speaking generally of external objects, "What we experience as qualitative change within ourselves is the effect of incoming atomic configurations being massed together so as to produce intensity of effect. What is massed together [on entering our sense organs] prevails [as a conscious experience], while what is widely diffused is imperceptible." The atomists explained the phenomena of earth, air, and water in terms of their component atoms, as well as ascribing very fine atoms to the phenomena of light. With heat as described above and light, the atomists thus explained fire. Comparatively speaking from a modern perspective, we might suppose that the atomist theory superceded Empedocles, as well as Thales and Anaximenes. Anaximander's aperion would seem to have fallen to the wayside, along with Anaxagoras' sperma, since the more intellectually accessible atoms would seem to have come to the foreground of discussion. Furthermore, Parmenides principle of Being was respected without recourse to not-Being and Heraclitus' notion of perpetual change was exonerated, since the large-scale motion and small-scale shuffling of component atoms was vital to the ever-changing appearances of all things. If the early history of discourse on the nature of material substance could be said to have exhibited an evolution of thought which verged on the truth of the matter with Democritus, his contemporaries took atomism as just another theory. Without means of proof or adequate demonstration, the sense of the matter under investigation soon became obscured by the immaterial considerations of subsequent thinkers. 1.6 Agora, Academy, and Lyceum The most famous intellectual lineage in the history of philosophy spans the length of three personalities and the depth of intellect with which Athens was awash during its heydey. The lineage-- Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle-- spans across the decades (407-323 BCE) during which the glory of Athenian democracy and culture reigned throughout the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean world, then slid from its zenith in Aristotle's time as the Macedonian polity swooped down from the north toward its era of world conquest. This is not to say that Socrates lived in a happier time but rather, by the time Plato processed all he had learned from Socrates then advanced his thoughts beyond; and, by the time Aristotle did the same with what he'd learned from Plato, geopolitical events had conspired to disrupt this particular progression of thought. Something of the thoughts of all three became more or less codified, revered, studied, imitated, and criticized in the centuries after their deaths but no person was able to carry their work forward. In the open-air market (agora) of Athens, Socrates questioned the wisdom of his fellow citizens with such impressive style that Plato as a youth became devoted to him. An erudite Plato in his prime founded the Academy to provide a complete education for the brightest minds and a model for future universities. Plato's Academy attracted from Macedonia the young Aristotle who, in turn, became a serious student and went on to found another great institution of learning at Athens, the Lyceum. Each of this triad presented a unique philosophy, albeit influenced by their predecessors, but of these three only Aristotle devoted much thought to the nature of material substance.
Figure 1.6
1.6.1 Socrates Born to a family of modest means circa 470 BCE, Socrates thrived in the bustling culture of Athens as his native city matured to become-- at least for several decades-- the beacon for creative thought and commerce in the ancient world. According to Theophrastus, the young Socrates studied at the school of Archelaus, a man best remembered as the successor to Anaxagoras. As the young Socrates grappled with the various theories of the cosmos, he may have been appalled by theorists who proclaimed blind mechanistic forces, and he may have rather favored Anaxagoras' claim that Mind was the motive force of the cosmos. Yet Socrates seems to have become dissatisfied with Anaxagoras' failure to articulate anything more of Mind after it had set the vortex into motion. From the mature Socratic perspective, nothing is fully explained or understood until its goodness-- whether judged in terms of human or divine utility but preferably both-- was made clear. So the youthful Socrates may have reasoned that, if Mind is truly a principle of cosmological import, then the principle of Mind should be used to explain how each and every thing in the cosmos is for the best. Perhaps he wondered how human thought judges 'best' and whether knowledge of that procedure might offer clues about manifestations of goodness in the cosmos. In search of somesuch explanation, the youthful Socrates seems to have turned his attention away from Nature at large to human nature as particular. Consternation with cosmological speculation was common at the time. Any speculation which doesn't yield earthly dividends is useless, afterall. The bustling commercial and political leaders of the Athens into which Socrates matured were particularly concerned with the enigma of human nature-- what makes some men worthy and others not?-- and its advantageous solution. Socrates sagely opened the market for speculation on that enigma. The market was very complicated at the time. Scepticism about political and moral issues prevailed as a result of cultural stresses which permeated Greek society in the 5th century BCE. Perhaps the Greeks were still haunted by ripples from the Minoan culture they'd overrun in the second millenium. More to the point, commerce and war had over recent centuries brought the Greeks familiarity with advanced civilizations to the south in Egypt and west in Mesopotamia-- Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia, with a taste of India. The Greeks also confronted the more primitive peoples known as Illyrians, Thracians, and Scythians to the north, as well as the Etruscans, Italics, Sicnas, and Sicels to the east along the Italian paeninsula. Each of these cultures had their own persistent mythos and way of doing business. Closer to home, the ancient Achaean tribal mode of political organization had slowly dissolved into a myriad of monarchs, oligarchs, despots, and landed aristrocrats among the Greek towns and city-states. A rising class of trade and craft folk was gaining influence in the cities. To underline the extremes in Socrates' time, Sparta had established a tightly regulated military regime while, in stark contrast, Athens bore a fragile democracy on the backs of slaves and to the exclusion of women. Within this arena of personal turmoil, a genera of philosopher arose in Greece which came to be known as sophist, after Sophia, the Goddess of Wisdom, since the sophists professed to impart wisdom to men engaged in practical affairs. The sophists taught grammar, the insight of the poets, the lessons of prevailing myth, religion, and politics, ethics, rhetoric, and eristic (the art of winning disputation). In exchange for a fee, the sophistical teacher promised to improve the student's ability to achieve success in the public arena through skillful conduct, and personal happiness through living well. For some, that meant gaining wealth and power. The best sophists, among them Protagoras, provided something like a finishing school for aristocratic youth. Yet the well-honed mind might take even the best of teachings and use it without scruple as, for example, with the famous aphorism of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not that they are not." On one side of the agora, a civic-minded student might argue that we-- in and of the polis-- are the measure of our own morality, but proclamations attributed to divinity or despot are not. On the other side, a mean-spirited student might argue that an individual alone is the measure, in opposition to other individuals: To push the point, might makes right. We may further imagine each, after becoming a teacher, competing with the other teachers for paying pupils. The worst of the sophists perfected the arts of persuasion, and their more skillful graduates, whether practicing in the commercial, political, judicial, or philosophical arena, could project even the most pernicious premise as if it were a noble cause worthy of support. Brilliant manipulations of sentiment, both public and private, fostered greater scepticism. Into such intellectual melee, Socrates stepped forth to forge a path toward some higher truth. Exhuding charm from an unlovely face, this squat hearty fellow charged no fee, wrote no treatise, nor established any school. Rather, Socrates engaged stalwart minds wherever he chanced upon them in the marketplace, courtyard, or banquet hall. Having served with distinction in the Athenian military on several occasions of battle, he did not shy away from direct confrontation. On occasion he'd bump into a politician who professed the value of a certain form of government, or a jurist who claimed some sense of justice, or a teacher who exalted the value of expertise in some intellectual art, e.g., rhetoric. After hearing an other crow, Socrates smoothed his way into the conversation by praising the speaker's esteemed knowledge of the topic, e.g., a just verdict in a public trial. Then Socrates would declare his own ignorance of the subject, e.g. the law or justice, and with all due respect to the speaker endeavor to elicit more detail from the 'knowledgable' person, followed by further honest questions. At the start of his career, few of his fellow citizens were exempt from Socrates' engaging style of conversation. With a bit of luck and much skill, the conversation might lead to a deeper insight on the topic or a better grasp on the human need to define-- for example, justice-- more completely. We can only imagine Socrates' ability to foment exciting discussions as we read Plato's "dialogues" which aimed to portray something of his master's art. And we may imagine that, while his first forays in the agora may have attracted a small audience, over the years Socrates developed a troop of devoted fans with youthful spirit who not only traded stories of Socrates' latest performance but also learned something from the experience. Any concept of importance to intelligent life was susceptible to Socrates' approach. Whether one should profit from another's loss, whether we should obey our elders and the gods, whether one form of government was able to function better than another-- Socrates' profession of ignorance empowered some of his listener's to think for themselves on each of many topics. Yet the Socratic style of investigation offended some who regarded their own opinions as above reproach and beyond questioning. Others were offended by the way in which Socrates beguiled innocent youth away from traditional values. After decades of practicing his trade in ideas, Socrates was indicted by several outraged citizens of Athens and brought to trial by elected officials in 399 BCE. Plato wrote this of the official charge: "[I]t states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings." The details of the trial and surrounding events have long been forgotten although several accounts have continued to fuel imagination over the millenia. I.F. Stone states the case most completely in The Trial of Socrates (1989, Doubleday/Anchor, NY). While describing many fascinating details, Stone makes two points-- one philosophical and one political--, both of which interweave. Philosophically, it must be said that the main contribution made by Socrates to clear thought was the elevation of the need for proper definition of important concepts. For example, what is the Public Good? But what happens, politically, when mere definition empowers men to act? Stone (pps. 68 and 71) refers to a later statement by Aristotle to underline the historical problem: "Socrates ... was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind [which] he called Ideas..." (Metaphysics I.6) How do we define 'civic virtue' or 'justice,' for example? If Socrates' listener believes that, by pursuing the definition vigorously, an absolute definition or grasp on the concept can be had, then the listener may be corrupted as that perfect conception is reified into a thing-- an Ideal-- which somehow exists beyond this confusing world of the senses. A tradesman or even a statesman may be elected to office based on his practical knowledge of justice gained from sensible experience. But if such person does not grasp the true ideal of civic virtue or justice, can he be trusted not to err in the making or application of law? Perhaps Socrates wisely refrained from the reification of political concepts into absolute ideals. Or perhaps not. But we know that his star pupil, Plato, did advocate the Good and the Just as ideals with absolute import. In his works published long after the death of Socrates, Plato strongly delineates an ideal form of Justice and an ideal State, ruled by a philosopher king. Presumably, Plato advocated his ideal notions prior to the trial, whether or not Socrates fully concured. Stone argues that in pursuit of a philosophical ideal both Plato and Socrates politically promoted a non-democratic faction of government over Athens twice, in 411 BCE and again-- through a band of oligarchs known as 'the Thirty'-- in 404 BCE. The sage and his protege, according to Stone, perceived a particular oligarchy to be closer to the ideal form of governance than democracy. Yet the Athenian democrats perceived that very same faction as tyranical and, after reestablishing a democratic regime in 403 BCE, eventually sought a modicum of 'just' retribution: They brought Socrates to lawful trial for crimes against the city-state. Apparently, Socrates was condemned to death by the poison of hemlock and, although offered the option of exile, willfully drank the cup. He swallowed the potion perhaps to prove the point, or so Plato's account in the Apology would have it, that for the sake of an ideal civic virtue he did obey the law. 1.6.2 Plato Born to Athenian aristocrats circa 427 BCE, Plato was raised to value the finer things in life. While still a boy, he may have imagined himself becoming a poet or playwright. As a young man he showed some talent for leadership and considered a career in politics. Perhaps he sought a sophist teacher to improve his knowledge of human nature, the law, and the art of rhetoric. Keen to experience the full excitement of the agora at the age of twenty, Plato's path crossed that of the mature Socrates. We do not know how close they became, but after seven years had passed in the circle of Socrates the young man faced the death of his revered elder. Dismayed at the trail and punishment of Socrates by the Athenian democracy, Plato retreated across the bay of Eleusis to the city of Megara. He may have returned within the year or he may have traveled to Cyrene, Italy, and Egypt-- the record is unclear. At the start of Athens' conflict with Corinth (395-394), Plato is said to have have served his native city militarily. Near the age of forty, Plato is known to have traveled to Italy and Sicily where he presumably studied with the Pythagoreans. There he became familiar with the family of Dionysius I, Tyrant of Syracuse, through which he may have suffered some misadventure. By 387 BCE Plato had returned to Athens and established an institution, according to Frederick Copleston "near the sanctuary of the hero Academus." It became known as the Academy and quickly grew in reputation. The dignity of the school is further described by Copleston: "The Academy may rightly be called the first European university, for the studies are not confined to philosophy proper, but extended over a wide range of auxiliary sciences, like mathematics, astronomy and the physical sciences, the members of the School joining in the common worship of the Muses. Youths came to the Academy, not only from Athens itself, but also from abroad; and it is a tribute to the scientific spirit of the Academy and a proof that it was not simply a 'philosophical-mystery' society, that the celebrated mathematician Eudoxus transferred himself and his School from Cyzicus to the Academy." (Copleston, p129-130) We may suppose Plato wrote a few philosophical dialogues prior to taking on the responsibilities of school administration and the presentation of regular lectures. Over his lifetime he published some two dozen dialogues, the earlier of which portrayed Socrates as the interlocutor in substance and style. The later dialogues use the dramatic figure of Socrates to argue towards philosophical positions which are more likely Plato's than his mentor's. Perhaps beginning with the Apology, Crito, and Euthyphron-- the early dialogues which feature Socrates discussing his trial and issues surrounding it-- Plato discovered his own literary strength in the attempt to capture something of Socrate's vivacity in the written word. As literature, these dialogues have worked everafter to project Socrates as a hero in the minds of youth who are prone to thought. Yet the later dialogues, growing more from the mind of their author as he matured through the intellectual stimulation of his Academy, appear increasingly populated by strawmen who too readily succumb to the fictional Socrates as he mouths the brilliance of Plato's ideation. Regardless of our judgments on their literary merits, the dialogues have offered food for thought to subsequent generations on a variety of topics including politics (The Republic and The Laws), virtue, beauty, and the nature of knowledge and being-- all of which are anchored by Plato's doctrine on the ideal forms. Perhaps the most widely known manifestation of Plato's thought, his theory of Ideas (i.e., ideal forms, Forms) is anchored in the Socratic quest for definition and heavily influenced, as we'll soon see, by the doctrines of Parmenides and Pythagoras. Plato seems to have accepted the Heraclitean notion that all sensible things are in a state of flux and concluded that study of such things could only provide an ephemeral familiarity but not true knowledge. As Aristotle explained Plato's next step, "if knowledge or thought is to have an object, there must be some other and permanent entities, apart from those which are sensible." The path to such permanence was pioneered by Socrates who "became the first to raise the problem of universal definition." Yet in seeking to know the ultimate definition-- the essence-- of a thing, "Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart [from objects and human activities in the sensible world]." Plato and his cohort, however, "gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas." (Metaphysics, XIII.4) Of course, the greatest idea is singular. With Parmenides and the Pythagoreans, Plato insisted that the Cosmos is One, Unchanging and Eternal, which cannot be known through the imperfect senses but only through reason. (By reason of its virtue, the One is the Good.) With Pythogoras, Plato insisted that true reality is best approached through mathematics and emphasized the teaching of geometry and number at his Academy. The ideal forms are akin to number, abstract and empty of sensible content, manifest hierarchically from the One true Being to the Many ephemeral manifestations. Yet the ideal is not number but a level of being beyond, the very source from which number is generated as an intermediary between the ideal and the sensible. There are many '3' numerals, for example, but only a single Idea of Triplicity. Likewise for men, or cows, or stars, or goodness, or justice. The Ideal Man and Ideal Cow were no doubt a manifestation of the Ideal Good in Ideal Justice. And all of these flowed hierarchically from the One of Pure Being. Or so we suppose, not being ourselves initiates. The Platonic logic begins with the assumption that the universal (the general 'essence') is more real than the particulars (the many) in a class of objects, then procedes with the assumption (in a Platonist's mind, the reasoned necessity) that the particulars only become manifest as they partake of the universal. As Aristotle explained, "[T]he many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they. Only the name 'participation' was new: for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by 'imitation' of numbers and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name. But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open question. Further, besides sensible things and Forms [Plato] says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in that there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique. Since the Forms were the causes of all other things, [Plato] thought their elements were the elements of all things. As matter, the great and the small were principles; as essential reality, the One; for from the great and the small, by participation in the One, come the Numbers." (Metaphysics, I.6) The theory of Ideas was never fully explained in any of Plato's dialogues. Some contain hints, allusions, and bits of doctrine (e.g. Meno, Symposium, and Phaedo). Other dialogues articulate one aspect or another of the doctrine more explicitly (e.g. Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Sophistes). Yet these exoteric publications merely whet the appetite for the whole truth-- the esoteric doctrine reserved for the worthy admitted to private lectures. Only devotees at the Academy were blessed with the true knowledge, presumably after they had mastered the prerequisite teachings. "We are told [by Aristoxenus, a disciple of Aristotle] that Aristotle used to relate how those who came to hear Plato's lecture on the Good were often astonished to hear of nothing but arithmetic and astronomy, and of the limit and the One." (Copleston p130-1) Given the heady import of his Ideas, Plato seldom publicly focused on the nature of materiality (i.e., the sensible world) in any detail. But around the age of seventy he published the Timaeus, a dialogue which may represent his views on how, why, and of what the physical world is made. Or it may not, since this creation story is arguably Plato's fable for the masses about matters only comprehensible to trained acolytes. In his previous dialogues, Plato always portrayed Socrates as the primary speaker but the Timaeus takes a different approach. Here, the story of creation is not told by Socrates but rather by Timaeus, a philosophical acquaintance of Socrates with some knowledge of the cosmos. Socrates only speaks at the beginning of the dialogue to launch the Timaean monologue as a story, an 'entertainment' among friends. Early in his oration it is obvious that Timaeus is speaking for Plato with these words: "We must in my opinion begin by distinguishing between that which always is and never becomes from that which is always becoming but never is. The one is apprehensible by intelligence with the aid of reasoning, being eternally the same, the other is the object of opinion and irrational sensation, coming to be and ceasing to be, but never fully real. In addition, everything that becomes or changes must do so owing to some cause; for nothing can come to be without a cause." (Timaeus, p40) After this simple brilliant core of Platonic doctrine, the teleological cause is given by Timaeus a godly face-- but whether cartoon or devotional, the reader must decide. Here's how it looks: This cosmos we inhabit was caused, as Timaeus goes on to explain, by a being called variously a craftsman, a framer, a god. Furthermore, "this world came to be in very truth, through god's providence, a living being with soul and intelligence." Although modeled on the eternal, this world of change is necessarily "corporeal, visible and tangible: but nothing can be visible without fire [i.e., light], nor tangible without solidity, and nothing can be solid without earth. So god, when he began to put together the body of the universe, made it of fire and earth. But it is not possible to combine two things properly without a third to act as a bond to hold them together." For geometrical reasons, "god placed water and air between fire and earth, and made them so far as possible proportional to one another, so that air is to water as water is to earth..." (Timaeus, p41) The creative being was not an Absolute God but rather a demiurge, since he worked within the limits of necessity and began with a preexisting matrix. "[T]his world came into being from a mixture [of] necessity and intelligence. Intelligence controlled necessity by persuading it for the most part to bring about the best result..." Moreover, the demiurge began with a primordial set of givens in a state of chaos. "There were, before the world came into existence, being, space, and becoming, three distinct realities. The nurse of becoming was characterized by the qualities of water and fire, or earth and air, and by others that go with them, and its visual appearance was therefore varied; but as there was no homogeneity or balance in the forces that filled it, no part of it was in equilibrium, but it swayed unevenly under the impact of their motion... And its contents were in constant process of movement and separation, rather like the contents of a winnowing basket..." (Timaeus, p66 and p72) That passage suggests a deviation from the Parmenidean doctrine. Being (the One) is modified into the Many (becoming) in space thanks to the force of motion. While this might suggest a nod of respect to the atomist theory which insisted upon the reality of motion in space, Plato's schema is more peculiar. The atomists held that chance collisions brought their indivisible particles into contact during the assembly of material bodies, but Plato believed that intelligence with necessity motivated the 'winnowing basket' to generate things in their becoming on the model of pure being. The Platonic 'space' through which motion occurs is no mere void but rather a receptable which Timeaus likens to a womb. Never empty, this space is "a kind of neutral plastic material on which changing impressions are stamped by the things which enter it, making it appear different at different times. And the things which pass in and out of it are copies of the eternal realities, whose form they take in a wonderful way that is hard to describe..." (Timaeus, p69) Furthermore, while the indivisible atoms of Democritus had an infinite variety of shapes, some of which just happened to be geometric, Plato advocated tiny solids of just four geometric types, each composed entirely of indivisible triangles-- themselves but manifestations of a Form, the ideal right triangle. "In the first place," Timaeus explains, "it is clear to everyone that fire, earth, water and air are bodies, and all bodies are solids. All solids again are bounded by surfaces, and all rectilinear surfaces are composed of triangles. There are two basic types of triangle, each having one right angle and two acute angles: in one of them these two angles are both half right angles, being subtended by equal sides [i.e., isosceles], in the other they are unequal, being subtended by unequal sides [i.e., scalene]. ... Of [these two], the isosceles has only one variety, the scalene an infinite number. We must therefore choose, if we are to start according to our own principles, the most perfect of this infinite number [of scalene types]. [W]e propose to pass over all the rest and pick on a single type, that of which a pair compose an equilateral triangle." (Timaeus, p73-4) Figure 1.7

Obviously, two such isosceles triangles of identical size can be arranged to form a square. And conversely, a square cut along its diagonal will form two such isosceles triangles. {See Figure 1.7 (a) and (b).} We may further note, more esoterically, that using a pair of scalene triangles to compose an equilateral triangle requires each right angled component triangle to have an hypotenuse of two units, a short side of one unit, and a long side equal to the square root of three units. The isosceles triangle, of course, has an hypotenuse equal to the square root of two and two equal sides each of one unit. The Pythagorean Theorem states why these particular square roots manifest in just these two types of triangle. But while the Pythagoreans found the roots of 2 and 3 troubling because 'irrational', Plato seems to have exalted them. From these triangles-- the isosceles and the most perfect scalene, as just described-- "the four most perfect possible bodies" are constructed on an atomic scale. The constructions begin with two plane figures, a perfect square and a perfect equilateral triangle. But the square and the equilateral triangle are not simply formed from isosceles and perfect scalene triangles as shown in Figure 1.7.(b). For some odd reason, Plato specifies the combination as shown in Figure 1.7(c). It makes no obvious geometric difference whether schema (b) or (c) is used since the only size requirement for the triangles is that they be invisibly tiny. We can only suppose it makes an esoteric difference (for details, see footnote). Thus using the schema of Figure 1.7(c), Plato's square is formed by using a combination of four very tiny isosceles triangles. Plato's equilateral triangle is formed by using a combination of six very tiny 'perfect' scalene triangles. Given his unit square and unit equilateral triangle, the most perfect three-dimensional bodies are formed by fitting many such units along their sides to enclose spaces. The miniscule equilateral triangles are combined in right proportion to construct the invisibly tiny (1) pyramids we sense as fire, (2) octahedrons we sense as water, and (3) icosahedrons we sense as air. The pyramid, octahedron, and icosahedron require the conjoining of, respectively, four, eight, and twenty equilateral triangles along their sides to enclose a space. The miniscule squares combine six at a time to form invisibly tiny cubes that we sense in large amounts as earth. Importantly, since the scalene triangles are of the same type, the elements of fire, air, and water are, according to Timaeus, all subject to decomposition and recomposition as their 'perfect' scalene subunits are aligned or sundered, thus enabling the transformation of one element into the other as the component triangles are rearranged. Being isoscelean, earth alone is the element not transformed into the other elements. As Timaeus explains: Although the earthly cube is readily decomposed and even though its isosceles triangles readily mix with the scalene triangles in the raw, the isosceles half-squares cannot align properly with any shape other than half-squares for reassembly. And of course, through assembly and disassembly of these four elemental bodies, and their various combinations, all the many things we sense becoming and perishing in our cosmos are given material appearance. (Timaeus, p73-8) While we might assume that Plato was building on notions first developed by Empedocles (the four elements), the devout Platonist must insist that the four manifestations of geometric form were considered to be 'qualities', not substance. "For it is difficult to say with complete certainty which of the elements we really ought to call water rather than fire, or indeed which we ought to call by any name rather than by another or even by all four. ... We see [water, for example,] solidifying into stones and earth, and again dissolving and evaporating into wind and air, air by combustion becomes fire, and fire in turn when extinguished and condensed takes the form of air again, air contracts and condenses into cloud and mist, and these when still more closely compacted become running water, which again turns into earth and stones. There is in fact a process of cyclical transformation. Since therefore none of them ever appears constantly under the same form, it would be embarrassing to maintain that any of them is certainly one rather than another.... Whenever we see anything in process of change, for example fire, we sould speak of it not as being a thing but as having a quality." (Timaeus, p67-8) The dynamic of transformation is a function of the triangles as their composite elements are subject to motion and rest. "When earth meets fire, [the cube] will be dissolved by [the pyramid's] sharpness, and, whether dissolution takes place in fire itself or in a mass of air or water, will drift about until its parts meet, fit together and become earth again, for they can never be transformed into another figure. But when water is broken up by fire or again by air, its parts can combine to make one of fire and two of air, and the fragments of a single particle of air can make two of fire. Again, when a little fire is enveloped in a large mass of air or water or earth and continues its motion in the moving mass, its resistance is overcome and it is broken up, and two particles of fire combine to make a single figure of air; and when air is forcibly broken up two and a half of its figures will unite to make up a single figure of water." (Timaeus, p79-80) Varying manifestations of the 'elements' or 'qualities' are further explained as their component triangles have longer or shorter sides (but always in the isosceles and scalene divine proportions based on the unit, two, and the square roots of two and three). The causes of motion include the after-effects of the winnowing force supplemented by a space-filling dynamic: "The circuit of the whole [the celestial sphere?], within which the constituents [i.e., the elements] are comprised, being spherical and therefore naturally inclined to return on itself, hems them in and allows no space to remain empty. ... So the contraction involved in process of compression [like atmospheric pressure?] forces the small particles into the gaps left between the large ones. You thus have a process in which small particles are juxtaposed with large ones, and the smaller disintegrate the larger while the larger cause the smaller to combine, and all are carried, up or down, to their own region; for a change in size involves a change in the position of their region. In this way a constant disequilibrium is maintained which ensures that the perpetual motion of the constituents shall continue unceasingly." (Timaeus, p81-2)

Besides a few more thoughts on physics, Timaeus explains how the senses interface with this materiality. Then he goes on to explain the mortal basis of the soul, the functioning of bodily organs, and disease. A smattering of comment on animals and plants completes the survey and allows him to conclude: "We can now claim our account of the universe is complete."(Timaeus, p124) The 'entertainment' offered by Timaeus is only peripheral to Plato's theory of Ideas and thus is not considered by scholars today as vital to his philosophical legacy. But in its day, the Timaeus offered something material to any student who might be subject to the competing temptations of the atomist legacy. And although Plato's idealist approach overall might be said to supercede if not synthesize the thoughts of Empedocles, Parmenides, and Pythagoras, its ultimate impact on the history of thought was to confuse the difference between being (ontos) and knowing (episteme) while forcing a complete separation of sense from reason for the sake of that confusion. While giving Heraclitus his due, Plato was the first to advocate that the pursuit of knowledge is necessarily divided into two loci, the object known (i.e., that which has being) and the means of knowing. As Plato drew the line, the particular within any class of objects is perishable, always changing, and initially known imperfectly through the senses. Such is true opinion (common knowledge). But the universal-- as an object with an independent being rather than, as we nowadays postulate, simply that which all examples of a class have in common-- is only known through Platonic reason (i.e., intelligence). And once known (according to Plato), the universal of a class enables a complete knowledge of all particulars in that class. By pursuing the universal for any class of particular objects as the essence within each, and then the Universal of universals, Plato claimed knowledge of True Being.

Upon an encounter with such fine ideas, a youthful mind might wonder unceasingly and, thus in disequilibrium, find it difficult to separate fact from fantasy without a mentor. But under the winnowing wing of a loving guide, Plato's world as materially manifest ideality might then appear as eminently reasonable. Especially when the youth is reminded of the key to such doctrine: "[T]rue opinion is a faculty shared, it must be admitted, by all men, intelligence by the gods and only a small number of men." (Timaeus, p71) At the age of seventeen, Aristotle walked into the Academy and decided to develop his intelligence with a small number of men.

Figure 1.8 Plato and Aristotle

1.6.3 Aristotle The progenitor of metaphysics did not utter his first cry in a void but rather on the edge of cosmic drama. Some fifty kilometers west of Abdera, the rustic town of Stagira stood at the base of the Chalcidice paeninsula which juts southerly into the northern Aegean Sea. The broad Kingdom of Macedonia stood to the west and north of Stagira while the wilds of Thrace stretched to the east and north. The Thracians were not Greek, but the Macedonians were-- by virtue of their language. Although the Macedonians were considered barbarous by the Greeks of the southern city-states, they spoke a Greek dialect which marked an ancient kinship. In 384 BCE at Stagira, Aristotle was born to an aristocratic family. His father became court physician and confidant to Amyntas II, King of Macedonia and father of Phillip II (who later became known as Phillip the Great in recognition of the military and political groundwork he laid for an empire). In his youth, Aristotle may have been educated at the Macedonian court with the expectation of a career in medicine. He was however drawn to Athens at the age of seventeen and in the following years made himself familiar at Plato's Academy. Over the next twenty years, Aristotle gained there a broad education in philosophy and mathematics as well as an intimate knowledge of the Platonic doctrine. There is no doubt that as a young man he fully studied the works of every major thinker in the Greek lineage prior to Plato, intially in the shadow of the latter's Ideas. At the age of eighty, Plato died of natural causes in 347 BCE. Perhaps because he was dissatisfied with Plato's successor as head of the Academy, Aristotle traveled to the eastern Aegean. He settled for a while on the coast of Asia Minor at Atarneus where he may have attempted to establish a branch of the Academy. Aristotle definitely married there and after three years the couple moved to Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, where he befriended the native Theophrastus who became his student and eventual academic successor. During this four year period, Aristotle exercised his curiosity of marine biology, collecting many samples and deepening his sense of classification by genus and species. Indeed, form and function as manifest in animal and plant may have been a life-long passion. In 343 BCE, after a brief stay in Stagira, Aristotle was called to the court of Macedonia by Phillip II who had ascended the throne and desired a tutor for his thirteen year old son, Alexander. While the boy may not have been too scholarly, Aristotle did his best to imbue Alexander with a reverence for knowledge and scientific investigation. Seven years passed, during which time a daughter and son were born to Aristotle and his wife, then Phillip's untimely death brought Alexander to the Macedonian throne. As his student thus graduated into statecraft and the arts of war, Aristotle may have relocated briefly to Stagira before returning in 335/4 to Athens. As his family resettled, Aristotle founded a school in a region of the city known as the precinct of Apollo Lyceus. Although the school was formally named the Lyceum, its members became known as peripatetics due to their ambulatory style of discourse and discussion, modeled after Aristotle's technique. The Great Peripatetic always lectured while walking around, his listeners following closely. Far to the north, Alexander meanwhile busied himself with the political and military resources organized by his father to launch the Macedonian conquest of the known world. The Lyceum soon became a gathering place for scholars and researchers, offering a substantial library and lectures on a variety of topics but without the idealistic agenda of the Academy (which continued to thrive under Plato's successors). Aristotle's lectures, as reflected in his propadeutic manuscripts (see below), covered every domain of intellectual inquiry-- logic, mathematics, astronomy, meteorology, cosmology, biology, physics, metaphysics, ethics, psychology, politics, rhetoric, and poetics. Judging from the breadth of his interests, the apparent structure in his presentation of a given topic, and his occasional statements which address the nature of science, we suppose he was above all dedicated to the enterprize of human knowledge pursued systematically. Each branch of knowledge, as Aristotle envisioned it, could be rooted in a few axioms or statements of self-evident principle particular to that domain of human inquiry, from which theorems or universal statements could be derived and proofs or particular examples could be presented to demonstrate the truth of the matter. He held the same view of artful enterprize in general, respecting the masters of a craft, the orderly sequence of actions required for its daily practice, and the practical steps required for passing the art from master to apprentice. In most of his treatises, Aristotle uses the first few paragraphs systematically to define the domain of his exposition. Let's take the science of clear reasoning, for example. "We must first state the subject of our inquiry and the faculty to which it belongs: its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demonstrative science. We must next define a premiss, a term, and a syllogism, and the nature of a perfect and of an imperfect syllogism; and after that, the inclusion or non-inclusion of one term in another as in a whole, and what we mean by predicating one term of all, or none, of another." (Prior Analytics, I.1.24a10-15) Applying such clarity to the art of poetry, he begins a treatise thus: "Our subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry. Let us follow the natural order and begin with the primary facts. "Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations." (Poetics, I.1.1447a7-18) One of Aristotle's several treatises on ethics begins with a statement that illustrates a primary principle which informs all of his efforts: "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity-- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others-- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends..." (Nichomacean Ethics, I.1.1094a1-10) Some five pages of means and ends later, we are ready for consideration of the universal good which will lead us to understand the master art of being good human beings. The spirit of Socrates shines through this exposition. While it is good that Aristotle pursued each of his topics systematically, even the most orderly introduction tends to unravel when the domain of inquiry is not neatly bounded by established practice, common sense, and syllogistic reasoning. Or at least an auditor unfamiliar with the state of the art in natural sciences -- in the fourth century BCE unmoored from an anchor of empirical evidence-- might feel lost in Aristotle's presentation of physics or biology. What we might call in retrospect the 'unfinished sciences' were in Aristotle's era muddled at best. Besides all that, Aristotle's method for any given topic was to present all the conflicting points of view. His approach to any given topic has been characterized by a modern scholar of Aristotle's teachings: "You set out 'what seems to be the case'-- which includes all the 'reputable opinions' on the matter; you then survey the puzzles which this material engenders; you try to resolve the difficulties without disturbing too many of the reputable opinions. And then? Then nothing: your philosophical task is over." (Barnes, p24) Indeed, that task was Herculean and Aristotle's resolution of certain difficulties, e.g. on being and becoming (for which, see the following section), was inventive to say the least. Yet Aristotle did not blaze any new trails in philosophical thought but instead sorted through, organized, and in some cases advanced and/or synthesized the prolific ideations of those who'd come before-- from Thales to Plato. His most unique achievements were in logic, ethics, and ontology (regretably for the latter and admirably for the former two). No doubt Aristotle was always working on one unresolved difficulty or another and encouraged his associates and students to do the same. A dozen years of lecturing and writing passed productively for Aristotle at the head of his Lyceum. Meanwhile, the Macedonian conquest of territory so brilliantly led by Alexander included subjugation of the Greek city-states, including Athens, along with the rest of the civilized world. Athenians resented their loss of sovereignty but dared not trouble Aristotle about his Macedonian past until after Alexander's untimely death in 323 BCE. Subsequently, the Athenians' vehement reaction against all things Macedonian caused Aristotle to leave the Lyceum in the hands of Theophrastus and retreat north to Chalcis on the island of Euboea. There the estates of his deceased mother's family provided Aristotle nearly a year's refuge before a natural illness caused his death. Writing in the third century CE, Diogenes Laertius listed over 150 titles in a catalogue of Aristotle's works, itself a copy of an earlier list passed down through the generations in lieu of the works themselves. Jonathan Barnes has estimated the listed works contained some 6,000 pages of text of which less than 2,000 have survived in thirty works. (Barnes, p9) What we today have intact of Aristotle was handed down through the Lyceum as each Scholarch (chief scholar and administrator) did his best to preserve and pass forward the Great Peripatetic's writings. From Aristotle's immediate successor, Theophrastus, to Adronicus of Rhodes, who headed the Lyceum circa 70-50 BCE, there were ten Scholarchs. (Copleston, p426) Over the intervening two and one-half centuries, the Lyceum had waxed and waned while two-thirds of Aristotle's written works disappeared. Perhaps the best was lost. While it is known that he wrote substantially during his years with Plato and his wanderings away from Athens, only a few fragments of those early works have survived the ravages of time. Evidence suggests that those works were well composed in a refined literary style, including artful dialogues in which Aristotle's own voice was primary-- in contrast to Plato's use of the surrogate Socrates. Compared to those early literary works, the surviving Lyceum collection was more pedagogical, consisting mostly of compilations from unadorned treatises, working drafts, and lectures which were aimed at the small circle of peripatetics. While the thoughts therein may once have been enlivened by Aristotle's animations during lecture, these texts as bare literature seem very dull to read and those on the natural sciences oft confusing. Nonetheless, a scholar of honest thought must find them provocative, and Andronicus did his best to organize what he had into a coherent body of works, some thirty in all. The Adronicus edition of the collection survived down to our time, and we have of Aristotle little more than that. Except for a few of those texts which read smoothly, many bear the marks of works in progress and/or cut-and-paste editing. All too often, lines of thought trail off uncompleted, abrupt abridgements interrupt the development of important themes, and lacunae abound. Some, like the Physics, contain major segments which were written at different periods of Aristotle's life and intellectual development. Some, like his two major works on ethics, contain identical passages, a section from one work obviously copied from the other by an errant editor. One (at the least) may have chapters woefully misplaced. For example, On the Soul appears to contain two final chapters (III.12 and III.13) which belong much earlier in the treatise (between II.4 and II.5, according to Everson, p180, footnote 17). The most extreme case of editorial doctoring is unfortunately the very work we seek to understand. As Jonathan Barnes has declared, "The Metaphysics is a farrago, a hotch-potch. [A]s soon as we ask the most elementary question, namely 'What is Aristotelian metaphysics? what study does Aristotle suppose himself to be undertaking in these essays?', we find ourselves in a perplexity. For the texts appear to offer us three or even four answers: the answers are certainly different one from another, and it looks at first glance as if they are actually incompatible with one another." (Barnes p68) The themes of the essays (or, were they scripts for lectural addresses?), sketches, and notes (lecture notes?) hotched together in the Metaphysics include Aristotle's thoughts on a science of first principles, the nature of 'being', the nature of 'substance', the question of theology as 'first science' (which is mentioned only in passing and not pursued), and the ultimate source of causality (i.e., the Unmoved Mover). Throw in a sketch of outstanding problems in philosophy, a philosophical lexicon, excerpts from the Physics, and a few references to Divinity-- viola! melange. If we imagine the task which Andronicus faced, we can hardly blame him for the solution he bequeathed us. All of the surviving Aristotlean corpus existed as a collection of separate scrolls, each containing 5-10 thousand words (15-30 pages) at most, grouped together as 'books' of larger treatises kept on one or another of the many shelves in the library. Just keeping them organized during constant use over the centuries must have been challenging. While the same was true of any manuscript collection in ancient times, few authors had been as prolific as Aristotle and none was so redundant. For example, a consideration of motion in the Physics reads quite similar to that in On the Heavens and On Generation and Corruption. For many of Aristotle's writings, there was neither an obvious story-line nor cast of characters such as the librarian might expect from Plato while working to refile misplaced scrolls. And aside from Aristotle's works on logic, ethics, rhetoric, and poetics, most every paragraph he wrote is peripatetic-- a rambling walk around some subject or another which soon digresses into yet another. By the time Adronicus was given responsibility for the collection, there were a number of scrolls which had lost their rightful places on the shelves and ended in a heap which had come to be called "ta meta ta phusika" (what comes after the scrolls on physics) on the shelves. Aside from a scroll's mention of "a science of Wisdom" (or "a science of first principles and causes"), little more than the vagaries of time had brought these particular scrolls together-- some fourteen 'books' in all. Not knowing what else to do with them, Adronicus organized them as a single treatise which became serendipitously entitled the Metaphysics. By the same token, as subsequent generations of men pondered the farrago as if it were a meaningful whole, the treatments of similar topics-- first principles, being, substance, essence, formal cause (including the question of Ideas as actualizing), final cause (teleology)-- by other authors were termed 'metaphysical.' The term did not exist before the Scholarchs' neologism took root in the minds of men and its meaning became subsequently as diffuse as its applications. The initial six pages of the Metaphysics is something of a prologue for "a science of first principles" which soon leads the reader into scroll after scroll of preambulatory consideration-- but nowhere near the science which was apparently promised. We'll examine that promise in Chapter 6, but here we must note that, aside from this prologue, every topic in the Metaphysics had been addressed by Aristotle elsewhere in his corpus-- logical principles in the Analytics; lexical considerations in the Categories; and questions of first principles, substance, causality, and being in the Physics, On the Heavens, and On Generation and Corruption. Are we then to judge that Aristotle's contribution to philosophy is in general metaphysical? Or shall we judge that by weight of complicated thought his Metaphysics is relatively more metaphysical than the rest of his work? Either alternative is confused by the cachet of the neologism grown encrusted over the aeons. Examples of fanciful thoughts abound in Aristotle's writings not included in his Metaphysics and, if we wanted to begin a list of them on a frivolous note, we might turn to On the Soul (e.g., III.4.429a20-429b5, III.5.430a22-25, III.8.432a1-2) or Prophesying By Dreams (e.g., 2.463b12-20, 2.464a21). At the heavy end of the scale, if we suppose the notion of an Unmoved Mover in Book XII of the Metaphysics to be the most 'metaphysical' of topics, we may find it in the Physics as the 'unmoved movent' which "causes a motion that is eternal and does cause it during an infinite time. It is clear, therefore, that the first movent is indivisible and is without parts and without magnitude." (Physics, the closing sentences.) This God also plays a major role in On Generation and Corruption (II.10.336b24-35). While it may be said that Aristotle paints more of a face on this ultimate being in the Metaphysics (at XII.7) than elsewhere in his writing, his doctrine of four causes-- which serves as a foundation throughout his works on natural science-- at every employment logically demands the Unmoved Mover as the final cause (i.e., the first movent). Having then cause for a second heavy example, we must note that his doctrine of four causes is frequently employed and several times described, although not fully explicated, in the Metaphysics (e.g. I.3.983a24-33, I.7) and yet the reader is therein referred to the Physics (II.3 and II.7) for a complete statement, and the doctrine finally finds its most gainful employment in On Generation and Corruption (II.9 and II.10, especially at 336b24-35). Let's take the notion of actuality and potentiality, the very foundation of Aristotle's understanding of substance, as a final example of his treatment of 'metaphysical' topics outside the Metaphysics. This thread of Aristotle's writing is perhaps the most 'metaphysical' (in the worst sense of the word) since it promises to explain how materiality is manifest from the immaterial. Yet actuality and potentiality are only discussed over several pages in the Metaphysics (XI.9.1065b-1066b). And this discussion only regards the phenomenon of movement and that only as a restatement (arguably not even written by Aristotle: see Barnes, p67) of the Physics (III.200b25-202a35). As we shall see in the following section, movement for Aristotle is only fully explained as the cosmos is explained and he does not offer such explanation in the Metaphysics, although referring to it. From the Physics, On the Heavens, and On Generation and Corruption, we learn that Aristotle's cosmos consists of a celestial realm which is pure actuality-- nothing comes to be or passes away, the celestial beings (stars and sun) are permanent eternally-- rotating around a center which contains the realm of potentiality, the sublunary world of materiality in which we live. The potentially is actualized from a substratum-- a reservoir of 'prime matter' --from which the perishable material things of our sublunary realm arise and to which they eventually return as they decompose. The nature of the reservoir and its actualization is barely addressed in the Metaphysics (V.7.1017a35-1017b5, IX.8) and mentioned only en passant in the Physics with reference to "the principle that everything either is or is not" which the Parmenideans used to deny motion and change. Aristotle there explains one way out of difficulty with that principle "can be explained in terms of potentiality and actuality. But this has been done with greater precision elsewhere." (Physics, I.8.191b26-28) We are not told where, but presumably it's where we find potentiality and actuality most completely explicated in On Generation and Corruption (II.7-II.10), to which we turn in the next section.
If neither topic nor treatment in the Metaphysics (aside from the initial six pages) is there treated uniquely in comparison to Aristotle's other works about the cosmos, how are we to specify a metaphysical topic or mark the concept of metaphysics? The question becomes more vexing when we note that any topic which we might deem metaphysical was first raised in one guise or another by one or more of Aristotle's predecessors. Their claims to have explained the true nature of this or that aspect of the cosmos prompted Aristotle to search for the most sound arguments before the rules of, or even need for, empirical evidence had been established. In other words, he and all of his most important predecessors were engaged in an enterprize of generating far-flung explanations with little regard for evidence. So if the word 'metaphysics' is used to suggest the presentation of fanciful explanations of cosmic proportions while skating on thin evidentiary ice, they were all doing it more often than not. If on the other hand we take the venerable term to mean a science of first principles-- as yet unrealized, including a principle of evidence-- then with Aristotle we may wonder how a principle is constituted, what virtue gives a principle priority, and what is the worth of the principle employed by this or that theorist in explaining any particular-- or every-- phenomenon. We'll further explore metaphysics along principled lines in Chapter 6, leaving the topic now with two observations: (1) in the generations after Aristotle few men felt the need to weave with yarns of fresh gossamer because the market was already glutted by the looms of the Greek sages, and would remain so for nearly two millenia; and, (2) the principles of natural science invoked by Aristotle to explain the cosmos were over the centuries demonstrated to be fallacious. -------------------------------------------------------------------- Footnote If we've imagined the schema properly with Plato, everything material in the world is formed of the four bodies in various arrangements-- i.e., as earth (cube), air (octahedron), fire (pyramid), and water (icosahedron) combine to appear as this material substance or that. And while, on the face of things, we have enough geometric form and number to satisfy even the most devout Pythagorean, Plato is more than that. His triangles not only manifest as the substrate of materiality but also manifest an ideality which transcend the limits of numeric ratio. According to Karl Popper's hypothesis (Popper 1998, p257), Plato may have supposed he'd discovered the secret of mathematics by finding a bridge between irrational numbers and geometric form by 'squaring' the circle. This bridge was only shown to initiates, way back when, and no one left a record, so we have no way of knowing about it except through Popper's conjecture. But Popper demonstrates that Plato's square (composed of four isosceles triangles) and Plato's equilateral (composed of six 'perfect' scalenes) can be used to construct a circle and a commensurate rectilinear figure the area of which equals the area of the circle. While that's not exactly 'squaring' the circle, the rectilinear figure embodies the important ratio known as Pi. In effect, the geometrical construction demonstrates that the square root of 2 plus the square root of 3 equals Pi. Or so Plato may have thought, having only fractions with whole number numerator and demoninator for calculation. The proper calculation requires the use of decimals, the utility of which only became known centuries later. With decimal fractions, we can see that Pi equals 3.14159... while the square root of 2 plus the square root of 3 equals 3.14626... That's close enough to appear identical in the lens of ancient mathematics, and Plato believed he beheld square roots commensurable with pure form, i.e., the circle as symbolized in Pi.